Quite simply we have the EBR because a certain member of the Div Staff loved the EBR "like" rifles his IBCT had built in Iraq in 2005. I wrote the ONS that got the M-16A4's US Cav is still using along with the on which resulted/contributed to the the M-14 EBR. During that time I worked on lots of soldier weapons and equipment issues for the 10th MTN. At the time the M-14's major failings were size, weight and total lack of support if something broke or you needed a new mag or even an ammo pouch.Īfter I retired I had a preety good job supporting troops until 2006. You carried the M-14 or you carried the M-4, to many tried to carry both which was in a word foolish. I never was quite happy with them and had to lay down the law the M-14's were an either or weapon. I managed to get the BN to order mags, and scope mounts from Spingfield and Leupold MK-4's to at least make them some what viable as many wanted to put them into use. They came with no optics, or some 5.56 ACOGs and one or two mags. Later in Afghanistan we inherited some M-14's from the 82nd and 173rd in the fall of 2003.
The various marksmanship courses 10th MTN developed provided the bulk of the training to the units. As a result I learned from Gunny Elder, the folks at Crane in charge of the MK-12 and the MK-14, and various others. I never got to spend a lot of trigger time behind a ACOG, but continued to listen to my troops using them and reaching out to various sources for more info in an attempt to build a Training Support package. Shortly after they were delivered the war started and they where put to good use and most if not all are still in service in the units which recieved them.īetween running a Infantry Co, or being the BN OPS Sgt. That first purchase was for the NSN version, due to it being the "SOPMOD" version, despite our recommendation to get the TA31. This was after we did a long eval of various ACOG's on T&E from Bill Taggert from Trijicon.
The first step we took was purchasing one ACOG per squad in 2-10 IBCT. Prior to that begining in the summer of 2001 I started researching the training and material requirements for the "new" Designated Marksman concept that was in the new M-16 manual. I retired from the 10th MTN in the summer of 2004 just after returning from Afghanistan. This is my current configuration as a retiried guy as used at the Jim Smith class in Nov at Ft. The requirement has emerged to engage (interspersed with non-combatants) IED operators, suicide bombers, and enemy marksmen within 300 meters that require immediate Central Nervous System (CNS) engagement, to reduce unit and non-combatant casualties. Many soldiers/leaders believe the current 5.56-mm weapon systems lack the accuracy to quickly index and engage targets between 300-600 meters frequently encountered in Afghanistan.Ĥ. Current small unit weapons are perceived to not posses the accuracy to provide the precision engagement of the lethal zone required at 100-300 meters most commonly encountered in Iraq.ģ. The capability to effectively place rounds into the Neck/Head Lethal Zone (4” wide x 8” high) as defined by FM 3-22.9 Chapter 7.Ģ. For the purposes of discussion I will use the following definition of the Designated Marksman’s Requirements:ġ. During the war, Soldiers and leaders have determined that a precision engagement gap exists at the small unit level, but have struggled to define what that gap is.